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George Orwell wrote a review of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf in which he made the 
following observation: 
 
“[H]uman beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in 
general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to 
mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades.” 
 
Philip Stephens brought this observation of Orwell’s to my attention in a Financial 
Times article that sought to make sense of the rise of populist politics in Europe and 
the United States in our time; a development that came startlingly to a head with 
the British referendum that triggered Brexit and the election of Donald Trump as 
President of the United States in October 2016.1 
 
Orwell invokes “self-sacrifice” in the passage quoted above. The word “self-
sacrifice,” however, especially when utilised in the context of “drums, flags, and 
loyalty parades,” requires careful scrutiny, as does the word “intermittently.” The 
notion of “self-sacrifice” will be scrutinised only briefly in Section II of this article. 
Scrutiny of Orwell’s use of the word “intermittently” is the task to which Section VIII, 
the concluding section of this essay turns squarely. It should nevertheless also be 
considered the overarching concern of the whole essay, beginning with its title: The 
Gift of Time and the Hour of Sacrifice.  This title puts forward, in a nutshell, the key 
thoughts that this essay seeks to put forward regarding Orwell’s use of the word 
“intermittently” in the passage quoted above. It also puts in a nutshell the response 
this essay finally offers to the “why now?” question that is central to Philip Stevens’ 
engagement with the question of the populism of our time. Why do human beings 
intermittently want self-sacrifice? And why do they seem to want it now? These are 
the key questions that will be of concern in what follows. 
 
Orwell suggests that people can live relatively regular lives focused on the fulfilment 
of basic needs and adequate levels of comfort for certain lengths – perhaps even 
considerable lengths – of time. But, then they also need, he writes, at least from 
time to time, a certain ritualization of a profounder commitment to something that 
transcends this ordinary life. And it is to this ritualization of transcendence (the 
transcendence of ordinary life) that the word “self-sacrifice” is linked in the lines 
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quoted above. The word “self-sacrifice,” as used by Orwell but also generally, 
require careful scrutiny. Section II of this essay aims to show that the word “self-
sacrifice” rarely has any real substance. Sacrifice, even when contemplated as “self-
sacrifice,” almost invariably turns out to be the sacrifice of someone or something 
else. It is the essential logic of the archaic concern with sacrifice to substitute self-
sacrifice with sacrifice of someone or something else. This point will be argued with 
reference to key analyses of sacrificial rituals in anthropological and philosophical 
literature, but also with reference to two very basic and realistic observations 
regarding the populist politics that Stephens seeks to understand with reference to 
Orwell’s invocation of the notion of self-sacrifice. 
 
After the argument that self-sacrifice invariably boils down to a matter of sacrificing 
something or someone else put forward in Section II, Section III sets out to explain 
what is fundamentally at stake in the concern with sacrifice that Stephens invokes – 
via Orwell – to explain the rise of populist politics in our time. Why do people 
sometimes – “at least intermittently,” as Orwell puts it – experience the need to 
sacrifice? Here again the question takes its cue from seminal anthropological 
literature, but also from a clue that Andrei Tarkovsky’s film The Sacrifice offers in this 
regard. The main character in the film, Alexander, has the sense that he has done 
nothing significant in his life. The big sacrifice that he makes towards the end of the 
film is his attempt to terminate his life-long inaction with a significant act. The 
current rise of populism in the United States and some countries in Europe may well 
be considered a fervent endeavour to terminate the perceived “inaction” that 
political liberalism has imposed on the peoples of the countries concerned. What is 
at stake in this sacrificial act to which these peoples are committing or threatening 
to commit themselves? At stake in it is nothing less than an act of founding or re-
founding the people; an act of restoring “lost” foundations or laying these 
foundations for the first time. Section III argues this point with reference to key 
thoughts of Claude Lefort and Giorgio Agamben.  
 
Section IV then turns more squarely to the “why now?” question announced above 
as the central concern of this essay. It nevertheless soon finds itself unable to pursue 
this question without first distinguishing between people who want sacrifice, at least 
intermittently, and people who do not. Not all people seem to want sacrifice and 
struggle. Some people indeed just seem to wish for the regular progression of 
ordinary life to continue. Political liberals wish for just this, contends Section IV. 
Realistic political liberals nevertheless know that this wish is likely to remain 
unfulfilled and that political liberalism, too, will in the final analysis not be able to 
extract itself from a sacrificial struggle for liberal values that it considers sacred. This, 
however, does not mean that liberals want sacrifice and struggle. They should for 
this reason be exempted from Orwell’s generalising categorisation of people as at 
least sometimes desirous of sacrifice. Not all people desire sacrifice. Political liberals 
don’t, argues Section IV. Liberals cannot deny that they too are often involved in 
sacrificial struggles and they surely also do not shy away from sacrifice when it 
appears inevitable, but they surely do not desire sacrifice and would prefer to avoid 
it. And the fact that they prefer to avoid it has a profound impact on the kind of 
sacrifices to which they are prepared to commit themselves. The sacrifices which 
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liberals would prefer to avoid, but cannot, are very different from the sacrifices that 
populists and fascists want. 
 
Section V begins to illuminate this difference between the sacrifices that populists 
and fascists want, and the sacrifices that liberals don’t want, with reference to a 
spectrum of sacrificial practices that the seminal works of twentieth century 
anthropologists distinguish. Anthropologists such as William Robertson Smith, Henri 
Hubert and Marcel Mauss, as well as René Girard in a different way, distinguish 
between sacrifices of communion, on the one hand, and expiatory sacrifices, on the 
other. The deep difference between political liberals, on the one hand, and populists 
and fascists on the other, concludes Section V, turns on this distinction between 
sacrifices of communion and expiatory sacrifices. Populists and fascists want and 
celebrate sacrifices of communion, that is, sacrifices that put them in touch with 
sacred origins and essences. Liberals, on the other hand, only invoke the sacred 
when they have no other choice, and when they do so, they only do so in a way that 
evidently seeks to take leave of the sacred again as quickly and as safely as possible. 
For reasons that will become clear in Section V, these sacrifices through which 
liberalism seeks to extract itself from the sacred should be considered expiatory 
sacrifices.   
 
The essay then turns – in Section VI – to another significant feature of the 
fundamental or founding act of sacrifice to which Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice alerts 
one. Alexander contemplates his sacrifice as a gift and observes that every gift 
requires a sacrifice. Following up on this clue, Section VI scrutinises the nature of the 
link between sacrifice and the gift and explores the possibility of severing it. It does 
so in order to explore the possibility of drawing a distinction between the politics of 
sacrifice and the politics of the gift. The politics of sacrifice concerns here the politics 
of foundation and re-foundation, that is, the politics of keeping the people in touch 
with its sacred origin and arche. It is this archaic and foundational – or 
fundamentalist – politics to which populist and fascist movements are evidently 
committed. With “the politics of the gift” is meant the non-foundational politics that 
is regularly associated with political liberalism or liberal democracy. These links 
between a politics of sacrifice and populism/fascism, on the one hand, and between 
a politics of the gift and political liberalism, on the other, are then discussed further 
in Section VII with recourse to a further distinction between (Schmittian) political 
theology and (Rawlsian) public reason.  
 
Section VII shows that the politics of the gift to which liberalism aspires cannot be 
extracted fully from the exigencies of a foundational sacrifice or sacer facere. 
However, to the extent that it cannot extract itself fully from sacer facere, its 
involvement in sacer facere remains, as already argued in Section V, a concern with 
expiation and not with communion. Section VII nevertheless aims to put forward the 
additional insight that liberal politics ultimately comes into its own when it succeeds 
in remaining predominantly a politics of the gift and not of sacrifice. This political 
liberal politics of the gift, goes the argument, is fundamentally inclined towards 
distancing itself from its own foundations; it is fundamentally inclined towards 
keeping its own foundations at arm’s length and at bay, as far as possible. And in 
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doing so, it comes as close as politics might – under conditions that are invariably far 
from ideal for doing so – to sustaining the Lefortian definition of democracy as the 
one arrangement of power that refrains from naming and fixing its own foundations. 
 
Section VIII then concludes the essay by finally turning squarely to the “why now?” 
question that has all along been hanging over it. It does so by unpacking the 
“intermittently” that Orwell invoked to characterise “people’s” occasional need for 
“self-sacrifice and struggle” in terms of the vicissitudes of a temporal alternation 
between a typical liberal concern with giving time, on the one hand, and the typically 
populist and/or fascist concern with a moment of “truth” that announces an un-
giving and unforgiving hour of sacrifice. To be sure, political liberalism can also 
sometimes become concerned with – and embroiled in – a moment of truth and an 
hour of sacrifice, as already pointed out above.  But when the concern with truth and 
sacrifice does visit political liberalism, it should and can consistently be considered 
an a-typical liberal concern.  
 
With the outlines of this essay drawn in the way they have been drawn above, one 
key objection to it is already quite predictable. It concerns the subtitle given to the 
essay: “A philosophical-anthropological analysis of the deep difference between 
political liberal and populist politics.” A critical response to this title may well want to 
contend that this essay is not a neutral philosophical-anthropological analysis, but a 
political liberal view of the difference between political liberalism and populism. In 
other words, an objection to the subtitle and to the essay as a whole may well be 
that it is not concerned with an objective scholarly analysis, but with putting forward 
a political view, a political liberal view, at that. In response to this plausible 
objection, I would want to state in the first place that I would have no qualms with 
any assessment of this essay as a political liberal engagement with the matters it 
discusses, provided that this political liberal engagement is not confused with 
neoliberal or libertarian views regarding these matters. In other words, as long as 
any attribution of a political liberal point of view to this essay would be accompanied 
by the due regard for the fact that prominent theorists of political liberalism (and 
many political liberals) conceive of liberalism as a politically progressive and 
egalitarian or (social democratic) concern,2 I would have no difficulty at all with that 
attribution. 
 
However, I would also like to state for the record that throughout this essay I make a 
real effort to describe the populist and/or fascist view of the themes discussed in a 
way that a populist or fascist may want to describe it him- or herself. The essay does 
not seek to put forward a “political liberal caricature” of populist or fascist views. It 
aims to describe these views in a way that a populist or fascist may well want to 
                                               
2 The political liberalism that I have in mind, then, is the kind represented by John Rawls and Frank 
Michelman. For further discussions and references to the works and key thoughts of Rawls and 
Michelman, see Van der Walt, The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty, 
Boston/Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 2014, 390-400; Van der Walt, “De-Legitimation by Constitution? 
Liberal Democratic Experimentalism and the Question of Socio-Economic Rights, Critical Quarterly for 
Law and Legislation, 2015 3, 307-309.   
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endorse with the observation, “fair enough, that is where we stand.”3 In fact, this 
essay may well run a higher risk that some liberals may end up responding to it with 
a dismissive “no, that is not quite where we stand.” I nevertheless put forward these 
thoughts in the hope that at least some liberals may recognize in them a portrayal of 
a liberalism that is guided by a more rather than a less rigorous conception of the 
liberality on which liberalism turns. Of concern in this portrayal is a de-
substantialization of liberal values that indeed aspires to contemplate these values 
as rigorously and consistently as one might.4 
 
II. SELF-SACRIFICE OR SACRIFICE OF THE OTHER? 
 
Anthropological and philosophical literature on the phenomenon of sacrifice in 
human social arrangements regularly alerts one to a key characteristic of sacrificial 
rituals: Sacrifice is always essentially a sacrifice of something or someone else, and 
not of the self. Sacrifice generally turns on a metonymic substitution of the object of 
sacrifice. To be sure, the demand to sacrifice, the literature tells us, is always directly 
addressed to the self. The demands of the “sacred” on the self (in Orwell’s terms: 
the demands of deeper significance that transcends ordinary life and endows it with 
meaning that it would otherwise lack) require that the self must sacrifice him- or 
herself. However, the intrinsic mechanism of sacrifice always aims at getting the self 
off the hook of this all too direct demand of the sacred (which, in fact, exacts nothing 
less than the complete life of the self and therefore its death). Sacrifice is the ruse 
through which the self gets away with its life by sacrificing, instead of its own life, 
something else.5 This “something else” must surely matter enough to the self to give 
the ritual purchase and make it “stick.” It – the object of sacrifice – is not quite the 
self, but it must be convincingly enough something of the self. The self must at least 
give up something important to it, some valuable property (that is indeed proper to 
it6), preferably some livestock that can be killed and of which the shed blood can 
symbolise viscerally the “shed” but ultimately unshed blood of the self. This visceral 
symbolisation of the self’s own blood becomes especially forceful when the 
sacrificial bloodshed concerns not just the blood of something else (animal sacrifice), 
but someone else (human sacrifice). 
 
The story of Abraham and Isaac is telling in this regard. The substitution of the self by 
something else cannot get closer to the self when the object of sacrifice is another 
                                               
3 For purpose of doing so I constantly kept Carl Schmitt’s well-known critique of political liberalism in 
mind. See Carl Schmitt Politische Theologie, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996 (1922), 63-64. In many 
respects, I believe this essay actually resonates well with Schmitt’s views, apart from, of course, 
endorsing as a political virtue exactly that which Schmitt considered a vice. 
4 Frank Michelman “Modus Vivendi Postmodernus? On Just Interpretations and the Thinning of 
Justice” (2000) Cardozo Law Review 1945-1970; Michelman, F, “Dilemmas of belonging: moral truth, 
human rights and why we might not want a representative judiciary” (2000) UCLA Law Review 1221-
1252; Michelman, “Postmodernism, Proceduralism, and Constitutional Justice: A Comment on Van 
der Walt and Botha” (2002) 9(2) Constellations 246-262. 
5 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, T-W, Die Dialektik der Aufklärung, Frankfurt a.M: Fischer 
Verlag, 1988, 16. 
6 The ancient link between property and selfhood is still evident in the French language in which the 
word “propre” signifies “one’s own”, that is, that which belongs to the self.  
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human being and none other, at that, than the own and only son of the one who 
brings the sacrifice. One can see how a “pure” logic of self-sacrifice might be at work 
in the case of Abraham and Isaac. One has already offered up something so close – 
so deeply intrinsic – to the self by the time one has raised a knife to offer up one’s 
own son in sacrifice, that the actual killing can hardly add something to the sacrifice. 
God must have realised that he had already received from Abraham all that he could 
possibly wish to receive from him when he saw Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his 
son (would the old Abraham not indeed have preferred to die instead of Isaac, and 
what could the lifeless body of Isaac have added to God’s pleasure that Abraham’s 
willingness to die had not already given to it). Seen from a human and mortal 
perspective, God’s incomprehensible cruelty must already have received all 
gratification it could possibly receive from Abraham, hence perhaps his intervention 
to spare Isaac. The story of Abraham and Isaac is an exemplary account of the 
relation between sacrifice and self-sacrifice in the lore and literature regarding 
sacrificial rituals, but it is also exceptional, for regular practices of sacrifice would 
always turn on the essential sacrificial manoeuvre of sparing the self in the face of 
the sacred. The story of Abraham and Isaac is therefore the exceptional example of 
sacrifice as self-sacrifice and for this reason the impossible possibility (for the 
exception cannot be an example and the example cannot be exceptional) of sacrifice 
that conditions (or motivates) all sacrificial rituals and acts without any such act or 
ritual ever standing a chance of instantiating its own condition or motivation.7 
 
One also sees a clear reflection of the need for the ritual offering to get as close to 
the self as possible – to get viscerally and evisceratingly close to the self – in George 
Bataille’s celebratory analysis of human sacrifice in La Parte Maudite. The aim of 
sacrifice is self-sacrifice, maintains Bataille, but human sacrifice in the form of 
sacrificially killing and offering up another human being to the sacred (to the sun god 
in the case of the Mexicans to which Bataille refers) can “legitimately” stand in for 
the sacrificial suicide that self-sacrifice requires, he argued. However, this 
substitution was only possible, he insisted, if the person thus killed and offered had 
been conquered in battle during which the one who is sacrificing the other had 
effectively put his own life on the line and had thus been ready to part with it.8 In 
this one respect – in this emphasis on the readiness to part with one self or what is 
closest to the self – Bataille’s analysis of Mexican human sacrifice surely resonates 
well with the understanding of the story of Abraham and Isaac offered above. Jean-
Luc Nancy, whose thoughts on sacrifice are central to the reflections that will be 
elaborated in this essay, nevertheless observes that Bataille’s concern with self-
sacrifice effectively remains a concern with the sacrifice of someone else, 
notwithstanding his significant endeavour to avoid the substitution that is key to the 
whole mechanism of sacrifice.9 
 
Nancy situates the substitution of the self by the other in the context of a whole 
metaphysics of sacrifice – especially evident in the thought of Hegel – in which the 
                                               
7 See the reflection on the difference between the exception and the example in Giorgio Agamben, 
The Coming Community (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota, 2003) 6.7-10.1. 
8 Georges Bataille La Part Maudite in Œvres Complètes VII, Paris: Gallimard, 1976 [1949] 55-65. 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communauté Désoeuvrée, Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1999, 36, 42, 46-48, 82. 
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sacrifice of the self always pivots on the sacrifice of the other.10 We need not engage 
with this history here. Suffice it to address this substitution from the perspective of 
two realistic and common sense questions that one should ask in response to 
Bataille’s contentions regarding self-sacrifice through sacrificing the other. 
 
1) How equal were the odds in the battle during which the self “earned” the 
legitimate “right” to sacrifice the other by vanquishing him? 
 
2) Even if the odds had been dead even, was the other equally committed to this 
adventure of self-sacrifice, or was it simply imposed on the other because of the 
self’s interest in “self-sacrifice”? 
 
If the odds were in any way in favour of the one who claims the right to sacrifice the 
other in an act of “self-sacrifice,” the claim becomes empty, for the self will not 
really have put his own life on the line in the same way the other has done so, and 
may well not have done so at all. Under these circumstances, the complete 
reciprocity that pure substitution demands – the complete reciprocity that might 
have turned the sacrifice of the other into an effective or at least plausible instance 
of self-sacrifice – all too clearly gives way to the metonymic substitution that is 
characteristic of all regular sacrificial practices. In other words, without complete 
reciprocity in all respects (completely equal odds), the self always offers less than 
the self, and offers, instead, something or someone else. The self offers less than the 
self for reasons of having put himself less on the line than the other has. 
 
However, even if the material odds could be said to have been equal enough to 
allow for a “fair” contest, it will not suffice as proof of a fair contest under 
circumstances where the battle could be imposed on the other against his will, that 
is, under circumstances where the one could impose the battle on the other, and the 
other did not command the means to avoid it. Complete avoidance of metonymic 
substitution is therefore only possible when both parties to the sacrificial contest are 
committed to the adventure of self-sacrifice from the beginning and commence with 
that adventure on a completely equal footing. It is therefore not only equal odds, but 
also equal willingness to engage, that condition the full reciprocity that pure (non-
metonymic) substitution demands.  
 
These considerations are key to an incisive understanding of what I would like to call 
an archaic concern with sacrifice in the populist politics of our time. During his 
inaugural speech, Donald Trump supplemented his announcement that his 
presidency will put America’s interests first with the “fair” recognition of the right of 
every other nation on earth to put their interests first as well. The upshot of this is 
obviously a real-political declaration of an international conflict of interests, one in 
which all contenders must and can earn the right to subject the interests of all other 
contenders to own interests in all cases where interests cannot be aligned. However, 
when one subjects Trump’s discourse to the two questions expounded in response 
to Bataille above, one clearly sees that this discourse can hardly be construed in 
                                               
10 See Nancy, Une Pensée Finie, Paris: Galilée, 1990, 65-106. 
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terms of self-sacrifice. Whatever self-sacrifice might be contemplated in it, is surely 
hedged by the bet that the self will probably get away with sacrificing the other or 
others without having to sacrifice itself. America is by a huge margin the greatest 
military power in the world (and the Trump administration is set on increasing the 
margin, as its first budget makes clear). At stake, here, is therefore nothing but the 
wish to create conditions under which any real conflict that can be expected to 
ensue will mostly shed the blood of the other and rarely (if at all) that of the self. 
And even if the odds were more equal, the question of equal willingness to engage 
in conflict is still bound to fail the “equal willingness” demand of the pure 
substitution test. The era of flagrant admission of conflicting interests that the 
Trump administration appears to favour is one that other nations on the face of the 
earth will not be able to avoid, however much they may want to do so. On both 
these counts then – equal odds and equal willingness – the sacrificial logic that the 
Trump administration appears to have endorsed is not concerned with self-sacrifice, 
but sacrifice of the other. A very impure metonymy is at play here, and it is doubtful 
whether the value “offered” even comes close to any offering that could make the 
ritual “stick.” In fact, not enough seems to be offered here to even partly cover up 
the sheer cynicism at large. Whatever rhetoric of sacrifice may be posturing here, 
falls dismally short of the logic of sacrifice.  
 
The same observation applies to the discourse of Brexiters who unilaterally wish to 
pursue Britain’s interests in disdain for any concern that is at odds with these 
interests, and to the whole spectrum of similarly disdainful populist movements on 
the move in Europe today. None of these movements are informed by a suicidal wish 
to put self-interest on the line for the sake of self-sacrificial transcendence. 
Whatever risks they are taking are evidently informed by speculative expectations of 
augmented self-interest. This mutation of the concern with self-transcendence 
through self-sacrifice into a concern with self-augmentation through sacrificing 
others (the mutation of pure sacrifice into instrumental sacrifice, one might say) 
does not detract anything from the observation that an ancient and archaic language 
of sacrifice is at work in the current rise of belligerent populisms. Ancient practices 
of sacrifice never evinced the purity of sacrifice that one might attribute to 
Abraham’s willingness to offer Isaac, or which Bataille allowed himself, in an 
exuberant moment, to attribute to the Mexicans. Bataille himself recognised the 
irreducible impurity of sacrifice in other writings. Consider for instance his 
elaboration of the concept of the fundamental contradiction that burdens human 
existence in L’Érotisme. The aim of sacrifice is to leave behind and break with the 
sphere of mundane existence, so as to become one with the sacred, he argues. But 
the cost of this union is generally experienced as too high, for union with the sacred 
demands complete renunciation of all mundane concerns and that demand – if 
complete – must include the renunciation of life itself. The complete renunciation of 
the mundane can only be accomplished by embracing an ecstatic death, and it is 
exactly on this count that self-concern – the concern with survival – invariably gets 
the better of the concern with self-sacrifice; hence the mutation of sacrificial rituals 
into instrumental practices that ultimately seek to promote mundane concerns 
instead of demoting and renouncing them. One sacrifices, in other words, in order to 
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solicit divine benevolence towards one’s earthly concerns. This is how the sacred 
gets reduced to the mundane realm of profitable “work,” as Bataille puts it.11 
 
III. THE RETURN OF AN ARCHAIC CONCERN WITH SACRIFICE. 
  
 “[H]uman beings …., at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice,” wrote 
Orwell in his review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. 
 
Whence this need for “self-sacrifice,” which, we have seen above, ultimately almost 
always culminates in the act of sacrificing something or someone else? Why is this 
need for sacrifice felt intermittently? And why might one call this need archaic, 
considering that it is still very much with us, as the current wave of American and 
European populism makes all too clear? 
 
Andrei Tarkovsky’s film The Sacrifice offers a significant clue to the first of these 
three questions? Alexander, the main protagonist in the film, is burdened by the 
sense that he has done nothing in the course of his life, hence his need to engage in 
a drastic act of sacrifice. He feels the need to do something significant, and he 
believes that an act of sacrifice will answer to that need. Why does he feel this way? 
Why has the long life that he has lived – he is already an old man when the dramatic 
sequence of events in the film begins to unfold – left him with the empty feeling of 
never having done anything significant? The idea that one only does something 
significant when one engages in some act of sacrifice is evidently also what informs 
Orwell’s explanation of the allure of fascism. The experience of ordinary life – life 
without sacrifice and flags and drums – as empty or devoid of meaning, is written all 
over it. Whence this sense of a void that human beings feel they need to overcome 
with sacrifice and drums and flags? 
 
Claude Lefort offers a penetrating answer to this question in his seminal essay 
“Permanence of the Political Theological.” Lefort writes: 
 
Every religion states in its own way that human society can only open to itself by being held in an 
opening it did not create.12 
 
Let us unpack this dense statement: Human society cannot have a sense of itself – it 
cannot open up to itself, as Lefort puts it – when it lacks the sense of deriving from 
and belonging to an origin that is not of its own making. The immediacy of everyday 
concerns does not allow for this sense of transcendent belonging. Everyday life is 
saturated with mundane undertakings that ultimately remain the self-made products 
of an endless stream of transient designs. Were life to be reduced to these mundane 
                                               
11 See Bataille, L’Érotisme in Œvres Complètes X, Paris: Gallimard, 1987 [1957], 34-35, 67, 115-117, 
155-63. 
12 Claude Lefort, “Permanence of the Theological-Political” in Hent de Vries and Lawrence Sullivan 
(eds) Political Theologies (New York: Fordham University Press) 157. The French text – “Permanence 
du théologico-politique ?” in Essais sur le politique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986) 287 – reads: “Que la 
société humaine n’ait une ouverture sur elle-même que prise dans une ouverture qu’elle ne fait pas, 
cela, justement, toute religion le dit, chacune à sa manière, de même que la philosophie, et avant elle, 
quoique dans un langage que celle-ci ne peut faire sien”  
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and transient concerns, societies and individuals would remain locked into (closed 
off by) an immediacy of present projects and programmes. These programmes and 
projects would be immediate for reasons of being entirely unmediated by (closed off 
from) some transcendent orientation. Were life to remain stuck in this immediacy, 
the lives of peoples and individuals would just come and go without ever having an 
external register that marks for them who and what they are. Religion typically 
opens up this space from which life can look back at itself and become a register for 
and of itself. And sacrifice is the essential act through which this becomes possible. It 
is the essential act through which religion becomes life’s register. It is this sacrificial 
opening up of a register without which human existence would remain mute and 
closed off in itself that Giorgio Agamben has in mind when he writes that all 
significant human action involves sacrifice. “All facere is sacer facere.”13 Agamben 
elaborates the thought in terms of the unfoundedness of human existence that 
requires that it produces its own foundation. He writes: 
 
[Sacrifice] furnishes society and its unfounded legislation with the fiction of a beginning … The 
ungroundedness of all human praxis is concealed in the abandonment to itself of an activity (a sacrum 
facere) that founds every lawful activity … It is the very ungroundedness of human activity … which 
the sacrificial mythologeme wants to remedy… 14 
 
It should nevertheless have become clear by now – see again the reflection on the 
impossibility of the exceptional example above – that the sacrificial act, or the 
making of the sacrificial myth, cannot meet the demand that it imposes on itself. It 
inevitably falls prey to a fundamental contradiction, as we also explained above with 
reference to Bataille. According to Bataille, we saw, sacrifice seeks transcendence of 
mundane life by becoming one with the sacred, but it always ends up returning to 
mundane life (augmenting instead of diminishing it, at that). It does so because the 
demand that sacrifice really exacts – embracing death ecstatically – is a cost that 
mundane life considers too high. Let us rephrase this contradiction in terms of the 
dilemma with which Lefort confronts the fundamental organisation of human 
society. Human society can only open to itself by being held in an opening it did not 
create, he writes. But, what exactly gives access to this opening? How is society to be 
held in it? And who will or must perform this act of “holding”? 
 
Religion has for as long as memory goes back provided the most enduring answer to 
these questions by imagining semantic frameworks within which aspects of life can 
be considered or made sacred. Along with this framework – which Lefort calls the 
“theological-political” (théologico-politique) came a veritable “division of labour” 
that entrusted the task of sustaining this theological-political framework to a 
relatively small religious elite. The ritual and liturgical practices of this religious elite 
“held society in an opening that it did not create itself.” Of concern in all of this is 
exactly the foundational work of sacer facere that Agamben brings to our attention 
in the passage quoted above. However, the description of this work or task of sacer 
facere offered here with reference to some (a religious elite) who perform it on 
behalf of others (everyone else who belongs to this religious community) again 
                                               
13 Agamben, Potentialities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 135. 
14 Ibid, 136. 
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underlines the fundamental contradiction from which it cannot escape. Sacrifice or 
sacer facere, as Agamben points out well, cannot hold society in an opening that it 
did not create, because it is itself the very act of creating that opening. It is 
ultimately nothing but an instance of human society itself holding itself in an opening 
that it creates itself. Sacer facere too, does not escape from the fatal confines of 
human facere. The sacrificial act remains a human act. It is just another human act as 
Agamben observes acutely: 
 
However one interprets the sacrificial function, in every case what is essential is that the activity of 
human community is grounded in another one of its activities.15   
 
In the end, sacrifice must fail. It concerns human action that seeks to transcend 
human action through human action. It returns to itself in the very attempt to take 
leave of itself. The very act through which society seeks access to an opening beyond 
itself, from where it might attain knowledge and consciousness of itself, is an act of 
terminal enclosure from which there is no escape. Bataille is evidently completely 
correct in this regard. The only human act that could break out of this circle would 
be the passage from life to death, that is, the act of dying. The question is, of course, 
whether dying can still be called “an act” and whether it has not already passed into 
some kind of inaction, the peculiar and singular inaction that indeed inserts human 
existence into an opening that it did not create itself, and briefly holds it there. 
 
Lefort, however, contends that there is one institutionalisation of human action that 
has adamantly endeavoured to hold society in an opening it did not create, without 
falling prey to the fundamental contradiction and circular self-confinement of human 
action from which only death escapes. That institutionalisation is democracy. Let us 
consider again one of the most well-known and frequently quoted passages from 
Lefort’s work: 
 
Democracy is of all political regimes … the only one to have represented power in such a way as to 
show that power is an empty place and to have thereby maintained a gap between the symbolic and 
the real … by virtue of a discourse which reveals that power belongs to no one.16 
 
Democracy, at least in principle, holds society in a space that it did not create. It 
does so by maintaining an irreducible “gap between the symbolic and the real … by 
virtue of a discourse which reveals that power belongs to no one.” At least in 
principle. Lefort is aware that the actual history of democracy shows that democracy 
has often misunderstood its own principle. It has always suffered from an ontological 
inability to read its own narrative of groundlessness.17 It too returned to narratives 
of sacer facere on the second day of its first significant experiment with the narrative 
of groundlessness, as he shows with reference to Michelet’s history of the French 
                                               
15 Ibid, 135.  
16 Lefort “Permanence of the Theological-Political” 159. The French - “Permanence  du théologico-
politique ?” 291 – reads: “[D]e tous les régimes que nous nous connaissons, [la démocratie] est le seul 
dans lequel soit aménagée une représentation du pouvoir qui atteste qu’il est un lieu vide.”  Cf. also 
Claude Lefort, L’invention Démocratique: Les Limites de la Domination Totalitaire (Paris: Fayard, 
Artheme, Librairie, 1994), 92: “[L]’image de la souveraineté populaire se joint celle d’un lieu vide, 
impossible à occuper.... ” 
17 Lefort “Permanence du théologico-politique ?” 329. 
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Revolution.18 Democracy, the only attempt to take leave of political theology or 
theological politics, almost forthwith returned to it; hence Lefort’s elegiac invocation 
of the “permanence of the theological political” in the title of his seminal essay. It is 
this apparently inevitable “permanence of the theological political” that has become 
manifest again today with the rise of populisms from the midst of societies that 
present themselves as exemplary democracies. In fact, the populisms on the move 
today present themselves in many respects as restorations of proper democracy, 
especially in Europe where they figure as the answer to the undemocratic 
governance that the European Union is imposing on its Member States. 
 
Today’s populisms may not be brandishing the language of divinity and deification in 
the expressly religious terms in which Michelet’s glorification of the French 
Revolution was saturated. Written all over them, however, is the idea of a sacred 
core of the people that has been desecrated by immigrants, refugees, Mexicans and 
Muslims, a desecrated core of the people that demands being made sacred again. 
The ancient archaic concern with sacrifice, the concern with arche and origin, is 
resurfacing today with startling force. And the question that one must ask oneself is 
indeed why now? This question, however, cannot be separated from another 
question that must be posed in this regard: Who actually? Who is it that 
intermittently – wants self-sacrifice and struggle? Just “people,” as Orwell puts it, 
suggesting that all people want sacrifice from time to time, or just some? And if only 
some, who then? 
 
IV. WHY NOW, AND WHO ACTUALLY? 
 
“Why now?” is exactly the question that leads Philip Stephens to Orwell to 
understand Trump and Le Pen. Stephens writes: 
 
Why now? Everyone has their own explanation as to why the Trumps and the Le Pens have succeeded 
where others have failed to tap into the anger and anxieties of so many. Stagnating incomes, hubristic 
elites, post-crash austerity, the insecurities thrown up by technology and globalisation, the cultural 
shocks of migration, all played a part. 
 
One would think that this concise inventory of the sources of the malaise of our time 
just about says it all, but Stephens doubts its explanatory value. “I am not sure they 
explain the striking energy of the insurgents,” he continues, and it is this uncertainty 
that leads him to the passage from Orwell’s review of Mein Kamp quoted above. He 
feels the need to probe deeper and finds what he is looking for in Orwell’s review: 
 
Nazism and Fascism, Orwell was saying, had caught a psychological current. Emotions elbowed aside 
economic calculation. Something similar is happening today if not, thankfully, on the same level of 
evil delusion. 
 
It is debatable whether this invocation of the “psychological current” prevalent at 
the time, and of “emotions [that] elbowed aside” rational or “economic calculation,” 
takes the inventory of explanations that Stephens has already offered much further. 
That a dark psychological current and an array of black emotions elbowed out 
                                               
18 Ibid, 309. 
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rationality then, and are doing so again today, would seem to be obvious. This 
observation just re-invites the questions “why then?” and “why now?” It should be 
noted that the passage from Orwell’s review of Mein Kamp indeed prompts one 
almost expressly to ask the “why then and now?” or “why now and then?” question. 
As we saw above, Orwell observed: 
 
“[H]uman beings … also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention 
drums, flags and loyalty-parades.” (emphasis added) 
 
It is this highlighted “at least intermittently” that prompts one to ask yet again: Why 
then? Why now? Why now and then? Why do humans want struggle and sacrifice, 
when they do, and why not, when they do not? Many social theorists and/or 
historians may well just want to take recourse to exactly the kind of phenomena 
listed in Stephens’ initial inventory to answer this question. Why do people 
sometimes rest content with the comforts of ordinary life, and why do they 
sometimes not? The answer to this question that these historians and social 
theorists are likely to offer is this one: People begin to be concerned about a deeper 
sense of belonging and purpose exactly when their expectations of ordinary material 
comfort and security become significantly threatened. However, if this is indeed the 
answer to the “why then and now? and “why now and then?” questions posed here, 
the list of causes that Stephens already offered should have sufficed to lay them to 
rest. But Orwell, at least, indicates that a significantly different response to this 
question is needed, a different response that that shows why Stephens’ suggestion 
that the question has not been laid to rest demands further attention. The passage 
quoted suggests clearly that people do not only want ordinary comforts and security, 
they also want sacrifice: 
 
[H]uman beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in 
general, common sense; they also, at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to 
mention drums, flags and loyalty-parades. (emphasis added) 
 
Orwell’s contention is clearly that people generally want comfort and security, but 
sometimes – intermittently, now and then – they also want sacrifice and the rest of 
the paraphernalia of populist if not fascist belonging, purpose and commitment. It 
still seems fair to say that the latter want is most likely to become more prominent 
exactly when the former is threatened. It seems fair to say that the “psychological 
current” that informs the latter is likely to be precipitated or triggered by an 
insufficient satisfaction of the former. Many historians would agree that the rise of 
fascism and Nazism in the first decades of the twentieth century can be explained in 
exactly this way. But Orwell’s use of the word “also” cautions us against linking the 
former and the latter want too closely or inextricably. The insertion of “also” into the 
phrase cautions against explaining the latter as a result of non-satisfaction of the 
former. He evidently suggests the latter need, the need for “struggle and self-
sacrifice” is a separate, independent and extra need that humans also have. Let us 
therefore take his suggestion seriously by taking a closer look at the difference 
between these two human “wants.” What is it that fundamentally distinguishes the 
ordinary concerns of life – “comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth 
control and, in general, common sense” – from the transcendent concerns 
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embodied in “struggle and self-sacrifice”? Posing this question is the only way of 
arriving at the deeper level of scrutinising the “why then and now/now and then?” 
question at which Stephens evidently seeks to arrive. 
 
There is, however, another good reason for asking this question. It concerns the 
conditions that inform the political liberalism with which Stephens begins to take 
issue in the wake of his engagement with Orwell. The first set of wants that Orwell 
describes – comfort, safety, short working hours, hygiene, birth control and, in 
general, common sense – can be considered representative of the form of life that 
contemporary political liberalism generally presupposes. Liberals would of course 
want to add or emphasise a whole array of political and moral values such as the rule 
of law, individual liberty, non-negotiable respect for human dignity and equality 
before the law, but most of them would probably also accept that all these political 
and moral values can be subsumed under “common sense.” The Rawlsians among 
them may well want to refer to this common sense as “public reason.”19 
 
The re-description of Orwell’s first list of wants in terms of a normative framework 
that one associates with political liberalism allows one to rephrase our “why 
then/now?” question differently: Why do the concerns and convictions of political 
liberalism sometimes hold, and why do they sometimes just seem to give way to the 
“psychological current” and emotions associated with populism and fascism? Posing 
the question in this way is important, for it allows one to take much needed critical 
distance from the thesis that Paul Kahn develops in his book Putting Liberalism in its 
Place. According to Kahn, the constative normative vision with reference to which 
political liberals generally put forward their optimistic vision of social co-existence 
and cooperation all too often lacks adequate recognition of the performative context 
of political struggle and sacrifice through which liberal political systems come into 
existence and which remains necessary to sustain them.20 Stephens seems to 
conclude his article on a similar note by suggesting that liberals all too often 
complacently assume the political struggle for liberalism is over. They too easily 
adopt an “end of history” mentality that blinds them to the reality that the fight for 
liberal values is far from over. In his own words: 
 
For Orwell’s generation the only answer was to fight for its values. Perhaps there is a message here 
too for the liberals who have blithely assumed these past few decades that it was enough to declare 
the end of history. 
 
This realistic regard for the reality that political liberalism concerns an on-going 
struggle for values that are far from safely established cannot be faulted. It can also 
not be denied that this struggle for liberal values will continue to exact bitter 
sacrifices that will always seem to put these values in question. Further to this, it 
must also be conceded that this sacrificial struggle for liberal values will, more often 
than not, if not invariably, concern sacrifices of others and not self-sacrifice. 
However, there is one respect in which liberalism can and must be exempted from 
                                               
19 See Rawls, Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 212-254. 
20 Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place, Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005, 113-
142.  
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the considerations drawn from Orwell’s passage above. One cannot say liberalism 
also wants sacrifice. It regards sacrifice as a lamentable aspect of human existence 
that should be avoided as far as possible, while knowing that it cannot be avoided 
completely. Liberals are quite content to live lives that afford them basic security, 
comfort and common sense and would easily pass up all opportunities for sacrifice, 
were this possible. It is also possible that some liberals indeed believe that the 
struggle for liberal values has been won and that history is over. Francis Fukuyama 
forwarded an almost caricature version of this “Hegelian” contention when the 
Soviet Union came to a fall towards the end of the 1980s.21 But politically realistic 
and politically intelligent liberals realise well that liberal politics is a precarious 
concern that is always pursued in a context of struggle and sacrifice. If they are less 
vociferous about struggle and sacrifice than nationalistic populists and fascists, it 
may well be because they would have preferred things to be different; because they 
would have preferred life to be an affirmation and even a celebration of ordinary 
existence. Kahn, to whom we return below, would have put liberalism better in its 
place had he not neglected to observe this key aspect of the political liberal frame of 
mind. 
 
Proper recognition of the very different attitudes to sacrifice that respectively 
characterise liberal mind sets, on the one hand, and populists and fascist ones, on 
the other, also requires that one grasp the very different social functions that 
sacrifice performs in these different mind sets. The social function of the sacrificial 
practices that liberals lament differs significantly from the social function of the 
sacrifices that populists celebrate. The next section of this essay will endeavour to 
throw some light on this difference. Before we turn to it, however, it seems 
necessary to conclude this section with the concession that we have not yet offered 
an answer to Stephens’ “why now?” question, despite having announced – see the 
heading again – that this is the question that will be addressed in this section. We 
simply seem to have turned from the “why now?” to the “who?” question. Who 
rests generally content with ordinary life? (Liberals, we suggested.) And who, at least 
“sometimes,” also want sacrifice? (Populists and fascists, we contended). 
 
However, the “sometimes” obstinately keeps on raising its head here, and it does so 
with good reason. One cannot turn the “why now?” question into a simplistic 
“who?” question, because the temporality of this “who” continues to complicate this 
question. This complication relates to the simple fact that there are sometimes 
enough people around who are content to live and celebrate ordinary life as liberals 
presumably do, and sometimes not. There are indeed times during which a 
psychological current – suddenly at large – turns just enough people (not even a 
majority is necessary) into celebrators of sacrifice to precipitate a wave of populism 
and/or fascism. It is with regard to this temporal swing from liberalism to populism 
and/or fascism that we need to restate and re-address the “why now?” question and 
we shall indeed come back to do so below. However, we postpone the question for 
now, for we will only be able to engage with it incisively enough once we have come 
                                               
21 See Fukuyama, F, The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, London: Penguin Books. 
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to understand the different social functions that sacrifice play in liberal and populist 
mind sets. Let us therefore turn to this question first. 
 
V. EXPIATION, COMMUNION, REDUCTION OF AMBIGUITY 
 
This section of this essay will take a closer look at the three anthropological theories 
regarding the social function of sacrifice that came to the fore in the work of William 
Robertson Smith, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, and René Girard. It will do so in 
order to pursue further the question regarding the difference between liberal and 
populist attitudes to sacrifice that have come to the fore in the previous section. 
  
Robertson Smith distinguishes between two main categories of sacrificial rituals, 
mystical rites and rituals aimed at sustaining communion and contact with the 
sacred, and those aimed at atonement after events that may have disrupted this 
sacred communion and contact. The communality and solidarity of the communities 
that took part in these rituals were believed to be conditioned by the deep 
connection with the sacred that these rituals established and maintained. The latter 
kind of rituals, those aimed at atonement and reconciliation with an offended god, 
argues Smith, were actually just different and later versions of the old rites of 
mystical communion. As Smith puts it: 
 
It has appeared in the course of our inquiry that two kinds of sacrifice … continued to be practices by 
the ancient Semites. The first is the mystic sacrifice ... The other kind of offering … consisted of 
holocausts, and other sacrifices, whose flesh was not conveyed to the god and eaten at his table, but 
burned without the camp, buried, or cast away in a desert place. This kind of service … was 
differentiated from the old communion sacrifice…. [An] analysis of [these] ritual holocausts … and all 
the variations of atoning ceremony [nevertheless shows that they are] nothing more than 
inheritances from the most primitive form of sacramental communion … for the ritual exactly 
corresponds with the primitive ideas, that holiness means kinship to the worshippers and their god, 
that all sacred relations and all moral obligations depend on physical unity of life, and that unity of 
physical life can be created or reinforced by common participation in living flesh and blood. 22 
 
Smith goes on to explain that the atonement rituals, far from being a new or 
different kind of ritual, simply reflected the inception of a new interpretation of the 
old mystic sacrifices in the course of time. This inception of this new interpretation 
reflected the gradual (but never complete) displacement of the older ideas of mystic 
union by the idea of atonement or expiation of sin.23 
 
Hubert and Mauss take Smith’s study of ancient Semitic rituals of sacrifice as the 
point of departure of their own investigation into the meaning and function of rituals 
of sacrifice in ancient societies, but they end up attributing a significantly different 
meaning to Smith’s distinction between rituals of communion and rituals of 
atonement or expiation, a different meaning that especially concerns the role of the 
rituals of atonement or expiation. According to them, rituals of atonement and 
expiation were principally aimed at extracting the sacrificial community from its 
                                               
22 Willian Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites (London/New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 
2002(1894)), 398-400. See also 339-352; 430. 
23 Smith, Religion of the Semites 400-405. 
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immersion in sacred solidarity, so that the members of this community could emerge 
from it as separate individuals who could recommence with mundane life and the 
social divisions – and divisions of labour – concomitant to mundane life. These rituals 
of separation and extrication served to establish a mundane sphere of instrumental 
cooperation within the boundaries of which communal existence took on different 
forms of individualised cooperation for purposes of procuring and securing the 
material conditions under which life as such could be sustained. This specific 
function of extrication from the sacred of rituals of expiation, contend Hubert and 
Mauss, demands that one draw a more fundamental distinction between these 
rituals and those aimed at communion, than the distinction Smith draws. They 
dismiss the simple equation of expiatory rituals to rituals of communion and holy 
immersion that results from Smith’s reduction of the apparent difference between 
them to the different meanings attributed to them in the course of time. 
This reduction ultimately prevents an accurate understanding of the complex unity 
of the sacrificial scheme, they argue. 
 
According to Hubert and Mauss, rituals of expiation and communion performed 
distinctly different functions within the overall sacrificial scheme, and any reduction 
of the former to the latter, or vice versa, cannot but lead to a misunderstanding of 
the overall unity of the scheme. The distinct and categorical difference between 
expiation and immersion within the sacrificial scheme must be respected and 
maintained for purposes of understanding the way they belonged to very different 
moments of the process through which the overarching sacrificial order was 
sustained. In order to do just this, Hubert and Mauss explain the sacrificial order in 
terms of a scheme of concentric circles, the traversal of which from the periphery to 
the centre and from the centre to the periphery consisted in two series of ritual acts. 
The first series of rituals gradually raised the levels of exposure to the sacred source 
of the community and of existence as such. These were the rituals of immersion and 
communion. They facilitated a spectrum of different levels of exposure to the 
sacred, at the far end of which ensued the most direct and unmediated experience 
of the sacred from which mortal life could not return. The most typical example of 
this irreversible entry into sacred communion was dying in battle, but falling under 
the axe of the executioner was closely related to it. Ancient societies relied on 
warriors as well as criminals and criminal law to sustain a direct connection with the 
sacred from which some individuals would never return. But short of this ultimate 
exposure, they also relied on a series of sacrificial practices that afforded a proximity 
with the sacred from which mortals could return unscathed, that is, without 
abandoning selfhood completely for the sake of an irreversible union with the 
sacred.24 
 
It follows from the above that war and the punishment of criminals – especially 
capital punishment – constituted the ultimate scenes of sacrifice and the ultimate 
sources of sacred solidarity and communal existence. When one steps down from 
this ultimate level of sacred exposure, one encounters what might be called the 
penultimate scene of the sacrificial scheme. At stake at this level of sacrifice was the 
                                               
24 Hubert, H and Mauss, M, Essai sur la Nature et La Fonction du Sacrifice in Mauss, M, Oeuvres 1. Les 
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highest level of sacred communion that still allowed for a return from this 
communion and for the re-entry of the mundane sphere of regular life. This 
penultimate scene of sacrifice was reserved for priestly officials who themselves had 
to be ritually consecrated before becoming capable of performing these rituals 
without exposing themselves and the community they served to lethal 
contaminations with the sacred. Proper consecration rendered the priests able to 
perform sacrificial rituals without causing contaminating spillages of the sacred into 
the mundane. Avoidance of such spillages was crucial for upholding the essential 
sacrificial order of existence, for this order depended fundamentally on a stable 
distinction between the sacred and the mundane. In other words, the consecration 
of priests and sacred places conditioned the essential primordial spacing and 
mapping of existence without which communal existence lacked the imaginary or 
symbolic framework that rendered it possible. Communal life had to be mapped and 
spaced before it could be lived and the sacrificial order provided it with this essential 
mapping and spacing. 
 
The sacred communion performed by priests allowed the rest of the sacrificial 
community an indirect communion with the sacred. In the wake of this communion 
followed a series of rituals that allowed for the return to the mundane. These were 
the expiatory or purifying rituals through which the members of a community exited 
the sacred solidarity that resulted from communion and returned to various modes 
and levels of individualisation, social differentiation and instrumental cooperation, 
that is, to the social zone of the division of labour which Durkheim called the organic 
solidarity (as opposed to mechanical solidarity).25  
  
Hubert and Mauss’ interpretation of archaic sacrificial ordering alters Robertson 
Smith’s interpretation considerably, but both their interpretations sustain the same 
religious or ideological framework. Both pivot on the understanding of ancient 
understandings of sacrificial rituals as vehicles or mechanisms of union with the 
sacred. An analysis of archaic sacrificial practices that does offer a significantly 
different understanding of the sacrificial scheme is the one that Rene Girard 
develops in La Violence et Le Sacré (Violence and the Sacred).26 Girard focuses on the 
way archaic communities resorted to sacrificial rites and practices to terminate and 
regulate violence. He explains the archaic administration of violence in terms of the 
need to prevent social ambiguities that are likely to give rise to eruptions of violence, 
on the one hand, and the need to terminate violence that has already erupted, on 
the other. Archaic social orders turned fundamentally on the establishment of 
unambiguous semantic orders within the range of which the likelihood of eruptions 
of violence was minimal or at least minimalized as far as feasible. The establishment 
of an unambiguous semantic order created a social space within the boundaries of 
which individual expectations could largely be harmonised. Within this space, 
individual members of a society shared a relatively clear concept of valid 
entitlements and expectations and consequently refrained from making or imposing 
demands on others that conflicted with their expectations. The regulation and 
maintenance of unambiguous sexual and familial relations were crucial in this regard 
                                               
25 Emile Durkheim De la division du travail social, Paris: PUF, 2007 (1930). 
26 René Girard, La Violence et Le Sacré, Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1972. 
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and any occurrence that might disrupt the unambiguous semantics of familial and 
sexual orders had to be dealt with effectively to prevent further pollution of the 
social order. The birth of twins, especially of twin brothers, threatened unambiguous 
family lines significantly and called for sacrificial measures that restored the stability 
of the social order. In many societies, the second born twin child was often left 
exposed to the elements so that its “natural death” could restore the familial 
order.27 But even two brothers of different ages could threaten ancient social orders 
with volatile ambiguity, as the stories of Jacob and Esau and Eteocles and Polynices 
symbolised well. The existence of two brothers in a family always endangered the 
social order and easily caused eruptions of violence.28 
 
When violence erupted, priestly sacrificial rites had to intervene in order to prevent 
the escalation of violence. Girard emphasises the miasmic nature of violence, that is, 
its tendency to pollute and contaminate more and more elements of the social 
order, once it erupts. Of concern, here, is the vicious potential of a first act of 
violence to precipitate spiralling circles of ever more violent vengeance. The 
arbitrary selection and sacrifice of a scapegoat was the way in which ancient 
societies sought to terminate such spiralling circles of violent revenge and to 
extinguish its potential to re-erupt. Sacrifice thus emerged as the essential device 
through which unambiguous social orders could be restored and maintained.29 
According to Girard, the essential social role of sacrifice consisted in reducing social 
ambiguity, that is, in restoring the unambiguous semantic order on which social 
cooperation depended. 
 
There are evident links or similarities between Hubert and Mauss’ conceptualisation 
of the sacrificial scheme, on the one hand, and Girard’s conceptualisation of this 
scheme, on the other, notwithstanding the obvious difference between them to 
which we will turn below. Sacrificial rituals can very plausibly in both cases be 
understood in terms of the religious absorption and channelling of a latent 
existential desire for bloodshed that can arguably be presumed to have existed in all 
archaic societies. In ancient societies, the archaic existential yearning to exit the 
mundane order of instrumental social cooperation so as to re-establish a connection 
with sacred origins would appear to have been embodied in an ambiguous complex 
of deep dread and desire, the most telling and compelling of which may well have 
been the dread of and desire for bloodshed. That a blend of deep dread and desire 
may well be a persistent anthropological phenomenon from which modern and 
enlightened humanity never quite escaped – or escaped at all – is rather evidently 
reflected in the Kantian definition of the sublime; hence perhaps the persistence of 
war as the ultimate ritual ordering of social orders even today. 
 
It is not difficult to see how war might fulfil both the social functions related to the 
ambiguous desire for and dread of bloodshed that come to the fore in Hubert and 
Mauss’ and Girard’s studies of sacrificial rituals. It puts a community in touch with 
the “sacred lifeblood” that sustains its unity and solidarity (it makes this lifeblood 
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tangible by shedding or risking to shed it), on the one hand; and it plays a pivotal role 
in the maintenance of unambiguous social orders that curtail the desire for 
bloodshed within communities, on the other. The externalisation of the projected 
object of libidinal violence that war facilitates (through identifying and targeting a 
foreign enemy), may well serve to reduce the desire for violence within 
communities. War may accordingly be considered an exportation of the deep 
potential for violence that lies latent within all social and semantic orders. One of 
the most pressing questions that the emergence of a global social order – equipped 
as it is with apocalyptically self-destructive armaments – poses to humanity today 
may well concern the increasing lack of export destinations that could accommodate 
this externalisation of violence. The current “clash of cultures” between secular 
and/or Christian capitalism, on the one hand, and Islamic fundamentalism, on the 
other, may well be considered one of the last resorts for this archaic mode of 
sacrificial social ordering.30 
 
Two key questions should be posed with regard to the sacrificial ordering of human 
existence expounded above:  Might humanity one day liberate itself from its 
sacrificial origins, as Jean-Luc Nancy suggests it might?31 And if not, might it at least 
contain its desire and or need for sacrificial foundations to sustainable levels? The 
answers that one may wish to offer in response to these questions may well benefit 
from observing a key difference between Hubert and Mauss’ scheme of sacrifice, on 
the one hand, and Girard’s, on the other. Despite all the imaginable and real 
continuities between their respective schemes of sacrifice, at least one crucial 
difference seems undeniable. Girard’s theory of the scapegoat, unlike Hubert and 
Mauss’ configuration of concentric zones of sacrificial ordering, focuses 
predominantly on the need for expiation. In Girard’s scheme, communion and 
immersion with the sacred is something that is not deliberately pursued, but 
something that occurs inadvertently and adversely. The sacred need thus not be 
pursued or approached by means of sacrifice. It can be expected to intervene in 
social and individual life from time to time. One need not pursue it. It will simply 
befall one. It will all too often suddenly be around like a seductive psychological 
current. The real origin of this current remains a mystery, but it seems plausible to 
consider the miasmic potential of bloodshed as one of its key catalysts. In Girard’s 
scheme, the need for sacrifice thus only concerns the need to avoid the sacred and 
to exit it as effectively as possible when exposure to it is evidently no longer 
avoidable. Girard’s conception of sacrifice can thus be understood as predominantly 
concerned with the dynamics that might sustain and restore mundane existence. 
 
This key difference between Hubert and Mauss’ and Girard’s respective 
conceptualisations of the sacrificial ordering of society provides one with a promising 
point of departure from which one may proceed to distinguish between two kinds of 
politics, one that turns predominantly on expiatory conceptions of sacrificial social 
orders, and one that turns predominantly on the quest for communion with sacred 
or holy communities. The two kinds of politics that are of concern here can roughly 
                                               
30 Hence, perhaps, also the incoherent notion that some countries should not attain nuclear capacity, 
for that would render contained military violence against them increasingly unfeasible. 
31 Nancy, Une Pensée Finie, 105. 
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be classified in terms of liberal and theological politics, that is, liberal politics based 
on, for instance, Rawlsian conceptions of public reason, and theological politics 
based on typically Schmittian notions of political theology. The future of sustainable 
levels of sacrificial social ordering (considering or at least assuming for now that 
some level of sacrificial ordering must be presupposed as inevitable), and the 
avoidance of apocalyptic ones (that can be considered excessive, unnecessary and 
potentially disastrous), depends largely on the former politics. It depends largely on 
a liberal politics that endeavours to restrict the human appetite for sacrifice to a 
minimum, and further to that, also endeavours to restrict this appetite to a mode of 
sacrifice that seeks to escape from the sacred instead of soliciting it. This thought will 
be pursued further in Section VII below. Section VI, to which we turn now, will first 
look into another mode of social ordering that may well aid the liberal concern with 
restricting the human appetite for sacrifice to a minimum. 
 
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN GIFT AND SACRIFICE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 
 
The introduction above already invoked the observation of Alexander, the main 
protagonist in Tarkovsky’s film The Sacrifice: Every sacrifice entails a gift and every 
gift a sacrifice. Alexander’s observation may well be inaccurate, but it touches 
suggestively on a complex problematic with which Marcel Mauss engages expressly 
in his seminal Essai sur le don. The brief engagement with this text that follows 
cannot and does not pretend to do justice to its richness and complexity. The aim 
here is only to highlight one its central themes with reference to a number of key 
passages. The first of these key passages is one in which Mauss contends that the 
morality and economy of the gift still constitutes one of the pillars of contemporary 
society: 
 
We shall observe the morality and economy at work in these transactions. And since we shall contend 
that this morality and economy still function constantly in our societies as its underlying dynamic, so 
to speak, since we believe to have found here one of the rocks of humanity [literally human rocks 
/rocs humains] on which our societies are built, we can infer from it some moral conclusions 
regarding a number of problems that result from the crisis that our law and our economy currently 
face.32 
 
The transactions to which Mauss refers here concern the various practices of 
exchanging gifts in archaic societies that his essay analyses. The morality and 
economy that informed these practices, he claims, still underpin the morality and 
economies of European societies. He believes to have discovered in these 
transactions nothing less than one of the rocks of humanity on which human 
societies are built. What might the other or others be that Mauss has in mind when 
he refers to un des (one of the) rocs humains sur lesquels sont bâties nos sociétés? 
                                               
32 Mauss Essai sur le don, Paris: PUF, 2007, 67-68 : Nous verrons le moral et l’économie qui agissent 
dans ces transactions. Et comme nous constaterons que cette morale et cette économie fonctionnent 
encore dans nos sociétés de façon constant et pour ainsi dire sous-jacente, comme nous croyons 
avoir ici trouvé un des rocs humains sur lesquells sont bâties nos sociétés, nous pourrons en déduire 
quelques conclusions morales sure quelques problèmes que posent la crise de notre droit et la crise 
de notre économie et nous nous arrêterons là. 
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He never comes back expressly to this point, but another passage early in the essay 
may well be a key to this question: 
 
The relations that result from these contracts and transactions between humans and between 
humans and gods explain one whole side [tout un coté] of the theory of sacrifice.33 
 
The ritual exchanges of gifts between humans, on the one hand, and humans and 
gods, on the other, claims Mauss, clarifies one complete side (tout un coté) of the 
theory of sacrifice.  What might the other side of the theory of sacrifice be, and how 
might these two sides of the theory of sacrifice relate to the other rock or rocks of 
humanity on which our societies are built, according to the passage quoted earlier? 
Mauss is again far from systematically clear as far as this question is concerned, but 
one point seems clear enough at this stage of our inquiry into his text: The theory of 
the gift or the analysis of the gift is part of a broader theory of sacrifice. This much is 
corroborated by the distinction between the sacrifice of communion, on the one 
hand, and the sacrifice-gift, the sacrifice-don or offrande, on the other, that he and 
Hubert draws in their Essai sur la nature et la function du Sacrifice. The sacrifice-don 
represents a later development in early forms of social organisation that partly 
displaced the blood sacrifice, the ritual of holy communion with the sacred, in which 
human life was offered to the gods. It constituted the first prototypal form of 
contract, namely, the contracts between humans and gods in which non-human 
animal life and later even vegetable agricultural products were offered to the gods 
instead of human life. Elements or cases of human sacrifice still prevailed after the 
inception of the sacrifice-don, but they henceforth remained predominantly 
restricted to the expiatory form of sacrifice related to criminal law and the 
punishment of crimes.34 
 
Might human sacrifice be the other rock, then, or one of the other rocks of humanity 
on which our societies are built according to Mauss? It is not absolutely clear from 
the text, but it is surely one of the possible inferences for which the text allows. Let 
us return to the analysis of the rituals of giving in the Essai sur le don to see if we can 
gain greater clarity in this regard. The essay distinguishes two major ritual forms of 
gift-exchanges, the regular prestation totale and the exceptional potlatch. The 
former entailed a major inter-familial or inter-tribal event in which not only material 
gifts were exchanged, but also immaterial social gifts. Societal relationships in the 
broadest sense possible and not only material economics were at stake in these total 
performances of giving and receiving of gifts. Donors gave something of themselves 
through the gifts they bestowed on beneficiaries (présenter quelque chose à 
quelqu’un c’est présenter quelque chose de soi) This giving of (a part of) the self that 
accompanied the material gift established and maintained deep social ties between 
the givers and receivers of gifts.35 Daughters were given away as brides, along with 
dowries, etc. Not only social but also sexual and familial relations were formed and 
regulated by means of ritual exchanges of gifts. The magic force of the gift that 
                                               
33 Mauss, Essai sur le don, 94 : Les rapports de ces contrats et échanges entre hommes et de ces 
contrats et échanges entre hommes et dieux éclairent tout un coté de la théorie du Sacrifice. 
34 Hubert and Mauss, Essai sur la Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice, 195. 
35 Mauss, Essai sur le don, 86. 
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created the social bond, which Maori jurists called the spiritual power or hau of the 
gift,36 was the essential force that underpinned the communal ties effected by ritual 
exchanges of gifts. This spiritual power or hau of the gift is also that which made the 
return of the gift compulsory. The appropriation of the gift for oneself invited serious 
bad luck, even death”37 
 
The gift economy evidently embodied two imperatives, the imperative to give and to 
receive gifts (to refuse a gift signalled a wilful severance of the social tie and basically 
amounted to a declaration of war) and the imperative not to appropriate for oneself 
any gift thus given and received. The second imperative, the proscription of any 
appropriation of the gift for oneself, relates to the social solidarity and the religious 
dimensions of the gift economy. Something of the self was given to the other but 
this something always had to be preserved and returned, and vice versa. From this 
resulted a network of close social ties, the force of which literally tied individuals to 
one another so that no one could lay claim to a completely independent form of 
existence, severed from the existence of others. The goal of the gift was primarily 
the solicitation of friendly relations, not the transfer of economic value – “[l]e but est 
avant tout moral, l’objet en est de produire un sentiment amical entre les deux 
personnes en jeu, et si l’opération n’avait pas cet effet, tout en était manqué…”38    
 
But there was more to the giving of gifts than the feelings of friendship solicited 
between two people or two groups of people. The fact that the gifts circulated in 
successive exchanges ultimately belonged to no one in particular implied that they 
must have some transcendent origin. The ancients involved in gift economies shared 
the sense that the gifts ultimately came from and belonged to the gods. They were 
similarly also considered to issue from the sheer generosity of nature and the giving 
of gifts between persons were also considered capable of soliciting this generosity – 
“les échanges de cadeaux entre les hommes … incitent les esprits des morts, les 
dieux, les choses, les animaux, la nature, à être “généreux envers eux. L’échange de 
cadeaux produit l’abondance de richess …”39 Exchanging gifts was for this reason also 
a way of evading bad spirits. “On   écart ainsi les mauvais esprits [et] les mauvaises 
influences …”40 The circulation of gifts thus tied all individual members of a gift 
society to one another, to the gods and to their natural environment in very 
fundamental way. At issue was literally a mixing of the human spirit with the spirits 
of things – “on mêle les âmes dans les choses, on mêle les choses dans les âmes…”41 
 
However, in some communities, more or less restricted to northwest American 
Indian cultures, the circulation of gifts mutated into a destructive competition of 
giving. In this way developed, in contrast to the more regular forms of the prestation 
totale described thus far, the potlatch. The potlatch was an exceptional form of gift 
exchange in the course of which every donor sought to surpass the value of gifts 
                                               
36 Mauss, Essai sur le don 84.  
37 Mauss Essai sur le don 83. 
38 Mauss Essai sur le don 102. 
39 Mauss Essai sur le don 92. 
40 Mauss Essai sur le don 97. 
41 Mauss Essai sur le don 103. 
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received by giving ever more valuable gifts in return. Instead of merely confirming 
with every gift given in return that nothing had been covetously appropriated when 
the gift was received, and instead of thus merely confirming the communality and 
community that resulted from participation in the circle of giving, the potlatch 
turned into an excessive individual gesture through which the donor showed that 
the material worth or value of the gift meant nothing to him; hence also the 
development of an extreme form of the potlatch in the course of which gifts were no 
longer received and returned, but ostentatiously incinerated. 
 
The gifts given under this extreme form of the potlatch curiously transformed the 
transcendental order of the gift economy. The generous giving and receiving of gifts 
solicited the benevolence of the gods and the generosity of nature, as we saw above. 
But it did so through giving to others and through receiving from others. In the most 
extreme forms of the potlatch this communal element of the gift economy 
disappeared. It was as if this extreme practice of competitive giving bypassed 
communal relations in order to establish a direct relation to the gods. In this respect, 
they could hardly be distinguished from certain practices and rituals of sacrifice. In 
fact, according to Mauss, these extreme forms of potlatch constituted a complete 
conflation of gift and sacrifice and an erasure of all differences between them – 
“nous avons ici, purement et simplement, la confusion des deux principes du sacrifice 
et du don.”42 
 
We have now put enough material from Mauss’ text on the table to point out its 
underpinning complexity and ambiguities. On the one hand, we encountered at the 
outset of our engagement with the text Mauss’ observation that exchanges of gifts 
between humans constituted one whole side of the theory of sacrifice – “tout un 
coté de la théorie du Sacrifice.” This observation suggests clearly that the study of 
the gift is a part – or side – of the bigger study of sacrifice. On the other hand, we 
have now also noticed Mauss’ invocation of a “simple conflation” of gift and sacrifice 
that occurs in the irregular practice of the potlatch. Further to this, we also noticed 
Hubert and Mauss’ observation of a certain overlap between gift and sacrifice in 
certain forms of sacrifice, notably the sacrifice-don or offrande.43 These invocations 
of irregular conflations of gift and sacrifice in the practice of the potlatch, or 
specified overlaps between them in the practice of the sacrifice-don, suggest that 
Mauss assumed the general stability of the distinction between gift and sacrifice. An 
irregular conflation or specified overlap is only possible on the back of a regular 
distinction. And this oblique but nevertheless pertinent invocation of a regular 
distinction between gift and sacrifice clearly renders Mauss’ initial subsumption of 
the study of the gift under the study of sacrifice (as part of the bigger study of 
sacrifice) puzzling and in need of further qualification and explication. 
 
The aim of this close scrutiny of elements of Mauss’ Essai sur le don text and Hubert 
and Mauss’ Essai sur la nature et la function du Sacrifice is not to point out logical 
deficiencies or banal contradictions in these celebrated texts. The aim is, on the 
contrary, to affirm these texts as perceptive engagements with irreducibly complex 
                                               
42 Mauss Essai sur le don 146. 
43 Hubert and Mauss Essai sur la Nature et La Fonction du Sacrifice, 195 
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and ambiguous social phenomena that manifest themselves in variations of stable 
distinctions between, and occasional conflations of, gift and sacrifice. The upshot of 
our engagement with these texts is this: Archaic sacrificial rituals and archaic 
exchanges of gifts can and should neither be simply conflated with one another, nor 
completely distinguished from one another. Analytically one may want to make 
more precise sense of the various complexities that come to the fore in Mauss’ Essai 
sur le don and Hubert and Mauss’ Essai sur la Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice along 
the following lines: 
 
1) The gift can be considered a form of sacrifice, provided one understands sacrifice 
as a broad category of all social practices that serve as transcendental conditions for 
all other social practices (the pillars on which society rests, as Mauss calls them). 
 
2) The gift must generally be distinguished from sacrifice when one considers 
sacrifice narrowly as a sub-category of social practices that evince specific features 
that are not generally attributable to the exchange of gifts. In other words, gift and 
sacrifice both become sub-categories of the broad category of sacrificial social 
practices that includes them both, but which Mauss nevertheless – for reasons on 
which we shall reflect briefly below – prefers to broadly call “sacrifice” (see again 1 
above). 
 
3) Among the sub-categories of social practices that can more narrowly be 
understood as either gifts or sacrifice (as in 2 above), there are also a number of very 
specific practices – the potlatch and the sacrifice-don or offrande – that evince 
characteristics of both gift and sacrifice and sometimes do so to the extent of 
actually erasing the key features that distinguish them from one another.  
 
4) The very specific conflations between gift and sacrifice – potlatch and offrande – 
considered under 3 above belong to the overall category of sacrifice (1 above) 
through belonging to the sub-categories of gift and sacrifice (2 above). This specific 
sub-sub-category of practices that cannot be distinguished clearly as either gifts or 
sacrifice, contemplated under 3, should therefore not be confused with the overall 
assumption of gifts under sacrifice under 1. 
 
The distinction between gift and sacrifice that will be invoked in Section VII to 
illuminate the essential difference between political theology and political liberalism 
will pivot on the understanding of gift and sacrifice as sub-categories (2 above) of the 
overarching category of sacrifice (1 above) that include the whole set of social 
practices or acts that transcendentally condition the possibility of all other social 
practices. Let us nevertheless reflect briefly on the relation of the sub-categories of 
gift and sacrifice to the overarching category of sacrifice before we turn to Section 
VII. Why does Mauss refer to both gift and sacrifice as sacrifice in a broad sense? It is 
fair to infer from the readings of both the Essai sur le don and the Essai sur la Nature 
et la Fonction du Sacrifice that he prefers to ultimately categorise both gift and 
sacrifice as sacrifice, because of the way in which they both produce the effect of the 
sacred. They both concern acts of sacer facere, acts of making sacred. 
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Why does Mauss also want to distinguish between these acts of making sacred? He 
surely does so because they produce the effect of the sacred in two very different 
ways. A reading of the Essai sur le don expounded above shows that gift exchanges 
were acts of solidarity that produce the effect of the sacred. When archaic 
communities solicited one another’s generosity through gift exchanges, we saw 
above, they also solicited the generosity of the gods, of ancestors and of nature, but 
the solicitation of generosity and solidarity among humans came “first.” Sacrifice, on 
the other hand, also solicited solidarity, but the reading of the Essai sur la Nature et 
la Fonction du Sacrifice expounded above shows that sacrifice solicited solidarity 
through acts that firstly sought to solicit the benevolence of the gods and the 
presence of the sacred. In other words, in the case of sacrifice, the solicitation of the 
gods came “first” and “solidarity” second. Solidarity was produced through soliciting 
the benevolence of the gods. This explains Mauss’ observation that some extreme 
forms of the potlatch were aberrations of the gift that turned the gift into an act of 
sacrifice. This was evidently the case in practices of the potlatch that no longer 
circulated goods and goodness among humans, but simply incinerated goods for 
purposes of exhibiting a sovereign disdain for and defiance of all mundane concerns 
with value. These forms of the potlatch evidently sought to communicate directly 
with the sacred through a complete disregard for the mundane. 
 
The overlaps and distinctions between gift and sacrifice expounded here are crucial 
for the distinction between political liberalism and political theology that will be 
drawn in Section VII, to which we turn now. Section VII will argue that both political 
liberalism and political theology are concerned with or involved in sacrifice or sacer 
facere in the broad sense contemplated under 1) above. They are both concerned 
with and involved in the transcendental conditioning of social co-existence. 
However, political liberalism and political theology largely (not completely) part with 
one another with regard to the sub-categories of gift and sacrifice contemplated 
under 2 above. Political liberalism, it will be argued, would prefer to establish the 
transcendental conditions of social co-existence through gift exchanges. Political 
theology, on the other hand, is inclined to do so through sacrifice (in the narrow 
sense of the word), and specifically through acts of sacrifice that seek communion 
with the sacred. To the extent that political liberalism cannot rely entirely on gift 
exchanges but also sometimes has to rely on sacrifice to establish the transcendental 
conditions of social existence, it typically engages in acts of sacrifice aimed at 
escaping from the sacred, that is, expiatory forms of sacrifice. The ideal type of 
political liberalism that will be described below, pivots on a principled refusal to 
engage in sacrifices of communion. 
 
VII. POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND PUBLIC REASON 
 
Seen from a Girardian perspective, both Schmittian conceptions of political theology 
and Rawlsian conceptions of public reason turn on sacrificial foundations. Both 
political theology and public reason seek to establish unambiguous social and 
semantic orders on the basis of which expectations within a community can be 
secured and coordinated in terms of a circumscribed set of rights and duties that 
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every member of the community can be expected to know and respect.44 There is, 
however, a crucial difference between a political theological and a political liberal 
social order and this difference turns on the respective levels of semantic ambiguity 
that they are prepared to tolerate. 
 
Schmittian notions of political theory seek to expel all ambiguity from the semantic 
order. It externalises all elements of social difference with reference to a constitutive 
friend-enemy index that turn political communities into unambiguous circles of pure 
“friendship,” pure solidarity and complete unity.45 The crucial operative terms in 
Schmitt’s conceptualisation of politics are existential unity (Einheit) and sameness 
(Gleichheit). Sameness, moreover, encapsulates for Schmitt two further operative 
notions, namely, identical similarity and absolute equality.46  It should be clear that 
no hermeneutic failure is thinkable within political communities that are constituted 
by an existential unity and sameness of which the key features are identical 
similarity and absolute equality. The semantic orders that organise (or emerge from 
the organisation of) such communities of unity and sameness evidently aim to avoid 
social ambiguity completely, or as far as absolutely possible. The only semantic 
ambiguity that can arise against the background of such unity and sameness must 
come from clear exceptions to the regular order. Criminal refusals to abide the law, 
on the one hand, and foreign hostility that threaten the semantic order from 
outside, on the other, are the quintessential examples of such exceptions to the 
order. When these exceptions materialise, the community declares them as such. 
They declare the exception and acts upon it in sovereign fashion. It does so through 
acts of expulsion and mobilisation. It declares non-abiding members of the group 
outlaws and non-members. Hostile foreigners or hostile foreign groups are similarly 
declared enemies. These sovereign acts restore the semantic order in no uncertain 
terms. They expel from it the ambiguity that threatened the unity and sameness of 
the community during the state of exception.  
 
Seen from the perspective outlined here, Schmittian conceptions of political 
community are largely in keeping with the Girardian conceptualisation of community 
in terms of the expulsion of ambiguity and the restoration of univocal semantic 
order. And, as we shall see below, liberal political orders cannot avoid all elements of 
this “Schmittian” dimension in their constitutive practices. They have to admit some 
of them. They too are frequently threatened by criminality and foreign hostility and 
called to respond to these threats in sovereign fashion. Paul Kahn’s “placing” of 
liberalism within a Schmittian sacrificial order is quite right in this specific respect.47 
However, Schmittian conceptions of political community typically do not stop here. 
They typically also embrace criminality and foreign hostility as invigorating occasions 
that reconfirm and revitalise the sovereign unity and sameness of the political 
                                               
44 I believe the political theological endeavor fails in this endeavor, as I explain elsewhere: See Van der 
Walt The Horizontal Effect Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty,  
45 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996 (1932), 26-47. 
46 Schmitt Verfassungslehre, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003 (1928), 3-11. 
47 Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place, 233-234. 
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group.48 They celebrate the military and soldierly identity of the group.49 And to the 
extent that they do this, they evidently reflect a desire for sacrifice that exceeds the 
need for expiatory forms of sacrificial organisation that societies may well not be 
able to avoid. In this respect they evidently also turn in many respects on notions of 
sacrificial solidarity of the kind that Robertson Smith and Hubert and Mauss describe 
with reference to sacrifices of communion. 
 
In other words, Schmittian conceptions of political community ultimately are or 
become positive concerns with orders of sacred communion and immersion. It is 
with regard to this positive concern with immersion in and communion with the 
sacred that liberal politics typically resists Schmittian conceptions of the political. It is 
with regard to this point that Kahn’s instructive but ultimately limited analyses of 
liberalism require further development. His placing of liberalism within a framework 
of sacrifice is not entirely spurious, but it can hardly be considered complete, and 
this lack of completion ultimately renders it inaccurate. Political liberalism 
characteristically turns on Kantian and Rawlsian concerns with peaceful 
cosmopolitanism. Political liberal communities, considered as an imaginary 
community, surely do not imagine themselves in terms of military or soldierly 
exigencies (from which, all too often, they of course also do not escape, as already 
mentioned above). They do not understand themselves as organised around a 
military essence. They are surely not driven by the dark desire to risk bloodshed and 
thus to touch, taste and confirm the lifeblood of their political existence. Their 
concern with blood is predominantly the Girardian concern with the prevention of 
bloodshed and the prevention of the disastrous pollution and contamination of 
semantic orders that result from bloodshed. 
 
Political liberalism is committed to an inclusive cosmopolitan world order. Liberal 
political orders would therefore, as far as circumstances would allow, avoid military 
conflict and the bloodshed concomitant to it. This avoidance has a significant impact 
on its attitude to sacrifice. Its commitment to an expanded cosmopolitan inclusivism 
largely discourages it from insisting strictly on unambiguous semantic orders. It 
therefore also discourages it from externalising ambiguity through criminalisation 
and military animosity. The result of this attempt at minimising its sacrificial scheme 
is a significant increase of internal social ambiguity. Liberal societies cannot avoid 
this loss of unambiguous semantic ordering. It is defined by it. It prides itself with it. 
At stake in this loss is a live and let live philosophy – a living with differences – that 
constitutes the liberal heart of liberal democracies. 
 
Social orders that no longer rely predominantly or pervasively on the sacrificial 
externalisation or exportation of social ambiguity and do so only for purposes of 
restoring and maintaining minimum levels of internal semantic clarity, surely need 
other ways of coping with the social ambiguity that they prefer not to export or 
                                               
48 See Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 46-47. 
49 Cf. Schmitt, “Totaler Feind, totaler Krieg, totaler Staat,” in Positionen und Begriffe: im Kampf mit 
Weimar - Genf - Versailles : 1923-1939, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot GmbH, 1994, 273: “Deutschland 
hat diesen Zwiespalt [zwischen bürgerlicher Gesellschaft und preußischem Soldatendstaat] heute 
überwunden und entfaltet in geschlossener Einheitlichkeit seine Soldatische Kraft.” 
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externalise. This is surely true of liberal social orders. How do liberal societies cope 
with ambiguity that they prefer not to export? The different way in which liberalism 
copes with social ambiguity usually goes by the name of tolerance. Nancy recently 
observed that tolerance does not constitute an adequate foundation for social 
solidarity, hence the eternal return of sacrificial political theologies.50 In other words, 
according to Nancy, political theology would seem to secure foundations for social 
solidarity in ways that liberal tolerance fails to do, hence the eternal appeal of the 
former, often at disastrous costs of the latter. However, quite to the contrary of 
what Nancy suggests, liberal conceptions of political community often provide viable 
and durable alternatives to political theological organisations of society. This 
suggests that there is much more to liberal tolerance than Nancy would seem to 
recognise. Could it be that liberal tolerance embodies something that is closely 
enough related to sacrifice to command much of the religious force that sacrifice 
commands, but different enough from sacrifice not to demand the refusal to 
accommodate difference and ambiguity that political theological orders appear to 
demand? And if this is the case, might this “something” at the root of liberal 
tolerance not be described in terms of a liberal exchange of social gifts? Is it not 
indeed the mysterious force of the gift – the hau, as the Maoris called it – that 
sustain liberal societies? Is it not the force or energy of the gift that allows liberal 
societies to live with and overcome most or at least many (certainly not all) 
difficulties associated with social ambiguities and differences?  
 
John Rawls provides one with a description of the liberal organisation of society that 
can indeed be likened to an exchange of gifts. He describes the emergence of a 
stable liberal political ethos in terms of the gradual transformation of an initial 
modus vivendi into a veritable overlapping consensus. The process starts with a 
compromise that inaugurates a mere modus vivendi. The more all the participants in 
the process abide the terms of the initial compromise, the more do they also gain 
trust that the terms of the compromise will also be respected in future. In the course 
of this process, that which usually begins with nothing more than a precarious liberal 
democratic compromise between individuals with profoundly different burdens of 
judgment (and conflicting comprehensive worldviews), eventually turns into a more 
or less stable overlapping consensus. Where and how do considerations of gift and 
sacrifice figure in this process? To assess the role that the giving and receiving of 
gifts play in this emergence of a political liberal consensus, one only needs to pay 
due attention to the simple fact that someone always has to take the first initiative, 
without knowing whether the initiative will be reciprocated.  Someone simply has to 
take a chance and run a risk. By taking this chance, the person doing so gives 
everyone else involved the chance to respond. The significance of the first social 
initiative must not be underestimated.51 
 
                                               
50 Jean-Luc Nancy “Church, State, Resistance” in Hent De Vries (ed) Political Theologies – Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006) 109. 
51 See in this regard my discussion of the role that Nelson Mandela played in the political transition in 
South Africa in Van der Walt “Timeo Danais Dona Ferre and the Constitution that Europeans May One 
Day Have Given Themselves” in Van der Walt and Ellsworth (eds) Constitutional Sovereignty and 
Social Solidarity in Europe, Baden-Baden: Nomos/Bloomsbury, 294-397. 
 30 
However, at this early stage of social cooperation, reciprocation too, is hardly any 
less a matter of taking chances and running risks, and thus of taking and giving 
chances in return. At this early stage, nothing warrants the assumption that the first 
initiative will be corroborated by another. Only when reciprocation has been 
forthcoming for a considerable length of time do the chance and risk elements of 
early initiatives and reciprocations dissipate to make way for significant levels of 
mutual trust and stable expectations. Only then can one begin to confidently assume 
the existence of an overlapping consensus that ultimately warrants something like a 
social contract with constitutional rights guarantees that have been made “sacred” 
and are no longer to be violated. Indeed, the exchange of gifts can also make sacred. 
It can also become a process of sacer facere, and of laying foundations. This is also 
why Mauss subsumes the gift under sacrifice in the broad sense of sacer facere as 
we contended towards the end of Section VI (see again the first of the four points of 
analysis outlined there). 
 
And yet, the gift remains distinguishable from sacrifice in significant respects. 
Perhaps the most important of aspect of its difference from sacrifice lies in its sheer 
horizontality. It makes or contains no initial appeal to transcendence. It is not 
accompanied by any claim to truth or authority that can be imposed on the other, 
from above, so to speak. It turns on an invitation that is unaccompanied by 
imposition. The self puts him- or herself on the line, but the other remains free to 
respond or not. Considered from this angle, the bringing of the first gift is the closest 
thing to self-sacrifice imaginable. The bringing of the first or early gift puts only the 
self at risk. In comparison, sacrifice is always a vertical affair. Whatever communality 
or horizontality it founds, always comes second, if it comes at all. Sacrificial solidarity 
is always conditioned by a direct relation to the sacred. The sacred is its foundation. 
It is already in place in advance, and it therefore justifies an imposition. All of this is 
different in the case of the gift. The gift commences without foundation, without 
ground. Its groundlessness is exactly what makes it a gift. Whatever ground it later 
attains, whatever it may make sacred in the course of time, whatever consensus it 
eventually establishes, always comes second, and later. This much is clear from both 
Mauss’s exploration of gift economies and Rawls’ genealogy of liberal consensus. 
 
We can also learn from both Mauss and Rawls that the consensual grounds that may 
emerge from an initial exchange of gifts remain conditioned by its initial 
groundlessness. Mauss suggests – perhaps obliquely but certainly clearly enough – 
that the element of risk cannot be eradicated from the gift economy.52 The gift – and 
the return of the gift – therefore remains groundless. The gift remains a gift. To the 
extent that it may become an obligation, it never becomes a founded obligation, the 
“foundedness” of which dispels the element of giving on which it turns. How can 
Rawls be said to be teaching us something similar? Perhaps his is also no more than 
an oblique instruction, but it can hardly be doubted that Rawls remains profoundly 
aware of the irreducible precariousness and fragility of any liberal consensus.53 
                                               
52 See Mauss, Essay sur le don, 180. For a discussion of the significance of this aspect of Mauss’ essay 
in Van der Walt, “The Origin of Obligations: Towards a Fundamental Phenomenology of Legal and 
Moral Obligation” in Scott Veitch et al (eds) (forthcoming). 
53 See Rawls Political Liberalism, 240-241.  
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Those liberals who continue to stick to the consensus, do not do so with the secure 
knowledge that its terms will be enforced. They know that it will often not be 
enforced or enforceable. Sticking to the deal therefore always remains, in some 
measure, a matter of groundless graciousness. The transformation of a modus 
vivendi into an overlapping consensus is never complete. The gift of liberal or 
constitutional democracy concerns the ultimately irreducible rest of risk-taking in 
which liberal democratic citizens engage on a daily basis. Liberal democracy pivots 
on this gift of taking risks with others. 
 
Can this reading of Mauss and Rawls stand up to Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of 
Mauss Essai sur le don? Derrida observes in response to the essay that there is no 
real gift at stake in any of Mauss’ contentions regarding the gift economy. Strictly 
speaking, Mauss is talking about early forms of contract and not about gifts, he 
claims.54 The point that he makes is surely forceful. We have seen from Mauss’ 
analyses of the gift economies of archaic societies that stable expectations in long 
standing arrangements of giving and counter-giving eventually attain a contractual 
quality that renders the distinction between the reciprocal giving of gifts and mere 
compliance with regular contractual duties questionable. There is therefore no gift 
at stake here, in any case no pure gift that truly lives up to its name. However, the 
very impurity of the gift – the fact that it cannot be extracted from contract – surely 
also points to the impurity and imperfection of contract. A gift that is at least in part 
a contract implies a contract that is at least in part a gift. Derrida’s insight can be 
turned against him by insisting that all contracts, at least in so far as they do not turn 
on sheer sacrifice of the other, must at least partly be a gift.55 And it is this insight 
that guides the understanding of political liberalism or liberal democracy that is 
proposed in this essay. The gift that political liberals and liberal democrats give to 
one another on a daily basis concerns the irreducible imperfection of the social 
contract between them. It concerns their willingness to stick to the deal despite its 
imperfection. This imperfection is the very condition for the graciousness that they 
show one another on a daily basis, as long as they show it. Nothing is really 
guaranteed, least of all graciousness. That is why Philip Stephens is compelled to ask 
the “why now question?” that he is asking with regard to the current rise of illiberal 
                                               
54 Jacques Derrida, Donner le Temps 1. La Fausse monnaie, Paris: Galilée, 1991, 39. 
55 It is of course true that the element of risk is reduced significantly by the fact that compliance with 
contractual obligations can in principle be enforced coercively. However, a significant margin of risk 
always remains. The possibility of enforcement undoubtedly reduces the risk, but not entirely. Every 
experience with litigation and the machinery of coercive legal enforcement is still accompanied by 
immense loss – loss of time, loss of basic existential energy and opportunity, ultimately also the 
material or patrimonial loss that results from imperfect or frustrated enforcement. The possibility of 
coercive enforcement never eradicates the significant extent to which contractual transactions turn 
on taking a chance with the ultimate willingness and ability of the other party to comply with the 
terms agreed. This is why there is an essential element of giving at the very heart of every contractual 
transaction. This basic reality is all the more evident in the case of violations of the social contract and 
the fundamental rights that it “guarantees.” These “guarantees” must remain written between scare 
crows, for no enforcement can restore them in the wake of violation, not only because post-violation 
enforcement is imperfect, but also because they were never fully warranted to begin with. In the 
acceptance of the imperfection of fundamental rights “guarantees” – the acceptance of the wide 
margin with which they always fall short of what they promise – lies the fundamental risk and chance 
that committed members of liberal societies take with one another on a daily basis. 
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and anti-liberal populisms. The United States and many regions of Europe seem to 
have lost the crucial margin of graciousness – we may also call it civility, with Rawls – 
that they need to hold their liberal institutions in place. 
  
What exactly is it that liberals give to one another on a daily basis, when they do? Let 
us begin to answer this question by noting that Derrida’s “critique “of Mauss 
ultimately “fails.” Contract does not displace the gift in the circle of gift exchanges 
that Mauss describes, for there is no such thing as a pure contract that is the 
complete opposite of the gift or complete displacement of the gift. There is no 
contract that is not at least partly conditioned by the gift.  Perhaps one should also 
note that Derrida’s critique was probably never meant as a critique and never meant 
to “succeed.” What must be noted, however, is the crucial insight at which Derrida 
arrives in the course of his “failed” critique of Mauss, for it is in this insight that goes 
to the heart of the gift that liberals give to one another, when they do or if they do. 
If it were possible to distil a moment of pure giving from an impure mix of gift and 
contract, that moment of pure giving would consist in giving the other the chance 
and the time to reciprocate. Giving is then essentially not a matter of giving value. It 
is a matter of giving time.56 This is also the essential insight regarding political 
liberalism that this essay seeks to put forward in response to the worrying un-giving 
and unforgiving tendencies of the time that we live in, assuming – not without 
trepidation – that we can must still talk about time here, and not – not yet – about 
some dark hour of truth and sacrifice.  
 
The liberal heart of the liberal social contract consists in the essential risk that 
liberals take with one another, the risk which conditions in transcendental fashion 
the time that they give to one another, and the space that comes with this time. 
That is how liberals live and let live. Their liberal constitution surely concerns 
fundamental norms that have become sacred for them, but they never turn to the 
sacred to become one with it. They turn to it, paradoxically, or perhaps even 
ironically, only to turn away from it and indeed to get away from it. In the final 
analysis, their liberal constitution remains for them an empty reference or referent 
that they only invoke procedurally for purposes of getting ordinary life somehow 
back on track again in the wake of some or other deeply hurtful or at least deeply 
frustrating social disruption. This, in any case, would appear to be the liberal 
constitutional spirit that that Frank Michelman envisages when he contemplates a 
procedural constitutionalism that might vault us past our differences and help us, 
not to resolve them with reference to substantively correct answers that embody 
sacred truths, but simply to get over them so as to get on with things again.57  
 
It is a completely different spirit – a very different psychologic current, as Stephens 
puts it with reference to Orwell – that sets in when people turn to the sacred to 
realise and give effect to it in everyday life, so as to become fully one with it. When 
this happens, the spirit of the gift gives way to a desire for sacrificial communion; 
and the willingness to live with social ambiguity and irreducible uncertainty – gives 
                                               
56 Derrida, Donner le temps, 45: Ce [ce] qu’il y a à donner, uniquement, s’appelerait le temps. 
57 See Frank Michelman, Modern Law review, “Constitutional Legitimation for Political Acts,” The 
Modern Law Review 66, no. 1 (2003): 1–15. 
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way to a narrow and unforgiving concern with sacred truths to which everyone must 
confess in order not to become outcasts or enemies. 
 
But why now? 
 
VIII. THE GIFT OF TIME AND THE HOUR OF SACRIFICE (CONCLUSION) 
 
The aim of the above exploration of different modes of sacrifice and of the 
possibility of a distinction between gift and sacrifice was to illuminate what really 
happens at a deeper level of political and social consciousness in temporal swings 
from liberalism to populism of the kind we are currently witnessing in the United 
States and Europe. A cloud is nevertheless still hanging over the long way already 
travelled thus far. The cloud is still Philip Stevens “why now?” question. It is still 
hanging there and still demands an answer, or some sort of response. This closing 
section of this essay will now retrace the path it has travelled up to now and then 
conclude with an at least plausible and hopefully instructive response to Steven’s 
“why now?” question. 
 
This essay drew a number of distinctions on the basis of insights gained from the 
anthropological works of William Robertson Smith, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss 
and René Girard. Key among them was the distinction between sacrifices of 
communion and expiatory sacrifices, on the one hand, and the distinction between 
gift and sacrifice, on the other. A third kind of sacrifice, aimed at the reduction of 
social ambiguity on which the work of especially Girard focuses, was considered a 
very specific category of the expiatory sacrifices that Robertson Smith and Hubert 
and Mauss distinguish from sacrifices of communion. 
 
All these distinctions should be (and were hopefully) approached with due care. 
They concern highly complex social phenomena that do not allow for the drawing of 
clear lines and watertight categorizations. Robertson Smith draws a relatively clear 
distinction between sacrifices of communion and expiation, but also shows that the 
same sacrificial rituals more or less served both purposes. Hubert and Mauss 
likewise insist that sacrifices of communion and expiation are different moments in a 
complex but unitary sacrificial scheme. From Mauss we also learned about another 
complex bundle of phenomena that seems to allow for a distinction, on the one 
hand, and fails to allow for it, on the other. Of concern, here, is the relation between 
gift and sacrifice. A theory of the gift is one part of a complete theory of sacrifice, 
Mauss claims on the one hand, suggesting that the gift is part and parcel of the 
phenomenon of sacrifice. However, he also claims, on the other hand, that certain 
forms of the gift – the potlatch in particular – constitutes an exceptional confusion of 
gift and sacrifice, thereby suggesting that gift and sacrifice can and must generally 
distinguished from one another. We unpacked this complexity with reference to an 
overarching category of sacrifice (sacer facere) within which sub-categories of “gift” 
and “sacrifice” in the narrower senses of these words can be distinguished, sub-
categories which in turn comprise sub-sub categories of exceptional phenomena of 
gift and sacrifice that again seem to erase the distinctions that make the sub-
categories possible. The analytical conceptual relief that this unpacking affords 
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evidently does not dispel the complexity of the social relations involved in the 
phenomena of gift and sacrifice. 
 
Considering these complex relations between different kinds of sacrifice and 
between gift and sacrifice, the links constructed in this essay between political 
liberalism and expiatory sacrifices, on the one hand, and between liberalism and the 
economy of the gift, on the other, should also be considered unstable and 
precarious. The same applies to the link forged between populism and/or fascism, 
on the one hand, and sacrifices of communion on the other. However, the instability 
and precariousness of these links do not render them spurious. It only means that 
they should not be presented in terms of over confident identifications of fixed 
essences or stable categories, but rather in terms of heuristic constructions of 
relatively distinct patterns or constellations of social phenomena that allow for some 
general and generalising observations while demanding adequate leeway for rather 
frequent exceptions. 
 
However, with this caveat is firmly in place, nothing seems to pose a serious obstacle 
to concluding the reflections in this essay with an observation that political liberalism 
generally turns on a gift economy that avoids sacrificial practices as far as it can. And, 
to the extent that political liberalism cannot avoid sacrificial social practices, the 
sacrifices from which it cannot extract itself will generally be of the expiatory kind. 
They will consist in practices that only invoke the sacred when forced to do so by 
circumstances that they would have preferred to avoid, and even then, will they 
mostly consist in a procedural ruse that almost immediately allows for a retreat from 
the encounter with the sacred that circumstances made inevitable. Liberals will 
invoke inviolable human or constitutional rights guaranteed by a sacred social 
contract in the face or wake of traumatic social disruption, but they generally 
understand well that the procedures – be they executive, judicial or legislative – on 
which they rely for the enforcement of these rights never embody these rights. They 
do not realise them. They only allow for a plausible retreat from them. They only 
allow for a retreat that, on the one hand, remains faithful enough to them to sustain 
the claim that they are duly honoured, while remaining adequately distanced from 
them, on the other hand, to allow for a politically, socially or functionally effective 
and speedy return to a mundane existence that is and must remain little concerned 
with sacred foundations. 
 
That is why “fascist liberalism” or “liberal fascism” or even just “overly zealous 
liberalism” must be considered unthinkably oxymoronic notions. Liberalism does not 
seek to embody the principles of liberalism in a way that populisms and fascisms do. 
When it remains true to itself, it remains true to the paradox that Ernst Wolfgang 
Böckenförde’s salient dictum regarding liberal secular state: The liberal state 
depends on (literally lives from – lebt von) presuppositions that it cannot endeavour 
to guarantee. It enters this risky condition (without guarantees) for the sake of the 
liberty that it avows.58  This is another way of articulating the paradox that Lefort 
                                               
58 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit, Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum 
Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1976, 60: “Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von 
Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren kann. Das ist das große Wagnis, das er, um der 
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attributes to democracy when he describes it as the one arrangement of power that 
insists that the seat of power must remain empty and gives effect to this insistence 
by sustaining an unbridgeable gap between the symbolic and the real. It is this gap 
that populisms and fascisms seek to erase through sweeping obsessions with 
identity and essential foundations. Populist and fascist movements pivot on the 
obsession to embody their constituting symbols and to erase the divide between the 
symbolic and the real. This is the primal unity that they seek to achieve through a 
notion of self-sacrifice that always culminates in sacrificing others. 
 
Why now? Because populists and fascists decide now. The question of time and 
temporality that Stephens brings into play when he asks “why now?” cannot be 
answered by providing a list of factors that explain why this obsession with the unity 
of the real and the symbolic – this obsessed psychological current – occurs when 
they occur. When one approaches the temporal question in this way one can hardly 
do better than offering the list or reasons that Stephens considers himself –
stagnating incomes, hubristic elites, post-crash austerity, the insecurities thrown up 
by technology and globalisation, the cultural shocks of migration. But the “why 
now?” question cannot be answered adequately with reference to a list of social 
factors that happen to subject societies to “new” strains and tensions to which they 
were not subjected before or up to recently, as Stephens senses quite correctly. It 
must ultimately be answered with reference to the ways in which people respond to 
these “new” strains. And is with regard to this response to social strains and 
pressures that theories of sacrifice and the gift do cast significant light on the “why 
now?” question. The “now” occurs when critical masses of people decide the time is 
up; when they decide that the hour of sacrifice has arrived. The “now” does not 
occur as long as critical masses of people decide to give time, to give the gift of more 
time. 
 
Social realities always become manifest as mixes of many things, and often as mixes 
of contradictory things. But to the extent that references to “ideal types” do 
sometimes contribute to one’s understanding of complex social phenomena, one 
may wish to consider the assessment that populists and fascists are always inclined 
and ready to declare the hour of sacrifice, they just wait for opportune moments to 
do so. And when they do, they also seek to make this hour last. They would make 
the hour of sacrifice last a thousand years if they could. They would terminate 
ordinary time for the sake of extraordinary time. Political liberals, on the other hand, 
are always inclined to give more time until misfortune ultimately forces them too to 
call the hour of sacrifice. However, when liberals finally call the hour of sacrifice, 
their sole concern remains to retreat from it as soon as they can, so that regular time 
can commence once more; so that regular time can be given once more. Regular 
                                               
Freiheit willen, eingegangen ist. Als freiheitlicher Staat kann er einerseits nur bestehen, wenn sich die 
Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von innen her, aus der moralischen Substanz des einzelnen 
und der Homogenität der Gesellschaft, reguliert. Anderseits kann er diese inneren Regulierungskräfte 
nicht von sich aus, das heißt mit den Mitteln des Rechtszwanges und autoritativen Gebots zu 
garantieren suchen, ohne seine Freiheitlichkeit aufzugeben und – auf säkularisierter Ebene – in jenen 
Totalitätsanspruch zurückzufallen, aus dem er in den konfessionellen Bürgerkriegen herausgeführt 
hat.” 
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time would appear to be just ordinary time. It is surely much too ordinary from a 
populist or fascist point of view. However, when one begins to realise that ordinary 
time turns on a gift that liberal minded people give one another on a daily basis, and 
very often give one another under difficult circumstances, one also begins to grasp 
that regular time is not just ordinary time. It is then that one also begins to realise 
that nothing needs to be done to make time extraordinary.   
 
